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This paper assesses the relationship between inequality and growth for 34 advanced 
OECD countries between 1990 and 2019 using recent Gini coefficients from Solt (2020) 
database and through a dynamic panel technique of two-step system GMM (Generalized 
Method of Moments). We find that the Gini coefficient of disposable income has a 
positive and significant impact, at a 10% level of significance, on subsequent economic 
growth over the five-year period. This result is explained based on the fiscal policy and 
saving channels, and also through the role of investment. More specifically, inequality 
translates into lower shares of public consumption and direct taxation on GDP, which 
boosts economic growth. Furthermore, inequality encourages saving and stimulates 
investment, which results in greater growth of the income per capita level.  
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The relationship between inequality and economic growth is one of the most 
studied topics in macroeconomic analysis. Despite the vast literature on this topic, there 
is disagreement, especially in empirical terms, about the effects of inequality on growth. 
Over the last few decades there was an in-depth investigation between inequality and 
growth, although there is no consensus in the relevant literature and a single global pattern 
has not emerged, i. e., a clear empirical regularity (Neves and Silva, 2014). Still, this 
analysis is significantly present in recent economic research (Lee and Son, 2016; 
Brueckner and Lederman, 2018; Gründler and Scheuermeyer, 2018; Woo, 2020). 
The main objective of this article is to investigate the impact of inequality on 
economic growth for OECD countries. More specifically, we intend to assess whether, to 
what extent, and through what mechanisms, the income disparity existing in these 
countries influences their growth dynamics. Therefore, we propose to analyse two 
inequality/growth transmission channels, namely, the fiscal policy channel and the saving 
channel. We consider that these transmission channels are more important in developed 
countries, compared to the other transmission channels listed in the literature, namely, the 
credit market imperfections channel, the sociopolitical instability channel and the 
fertility/education joint decision channel.  
Regarding the fiscal policy transmission channel, both theoretical and empirical 
literature has found that the income distribution plays an important role in affecting the 
public sector action and, consequently, economic growth. The contributions of Alesina 
and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Perotti (1996), Tanninen (1999), 
Bénabou (2000) and De Mello and Tiongson (2006), among others, points to the several 
ways that fiscal policy serves as a transmission channel.  
In what respects the saving transmission channel, proposed by Kaldor (1956), the 
empirical literature is scarce about the importance of this macroeconomic variable in 
driven the effects of inequality on per capita GDP growth rate. In this article, we aim to 
overcome this gap in the literature. Furthermore, we assess the role of investment on the 
relationship between inequality and growth. Theoretical literature, for example, Galor and 
Zeira (1994) and Galor and Moav (2004), establishes that inequality affects investment 
in human capital and physical capital, either negatively or positively, and this, in turn, 
positively influences economic growth. Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Barro (2000) 
also empirically studied the importance of the investment on the relationship between 
income disparities and growth.  
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Voitckovsky (2005) and Castelló-Climent (2010) use the system GMM of 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to investigate the effect of 
inequality on growth in developed countries only in the reduced form, not exploring 
transmission channels. Bartak and Jabłoński (2019) study the impact of income inequality 
on economic growth for OECD countries in the period 1990-2014. Their analysis focuses 
essentially on the relationship in reduced form, considering several measures of 
inequality, in addition to the Gini coefficient. However, the authors also do not investigate 
the transmission mechanisms between both variables. In this article, we explore this issue 
by considering the importance of fiscal policy and saving channels as well as the role of 
investment in understanding the nexus between inequality and growth for OECD 
countries. 
This article contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the analysis covers 
a recent period, from 1990 to 2019, and considers as an empirical scope the thirty-four 
advanced OECD countries, which constitute the majority of developed countries. Second, 
we use version 9.0 of the SWIID – Standardized World Income Inequality Database from 
Solt (2020) that provides comparable market and disposable Gini coefficients of 
equivalized households disposable income for 196 countries between 1960 and 2019. 
Third, we study the relationship between inequality and growth in reduced form, that is, 
we assume that inequality is a determinant of economic growth together with other factors 
usually considered in growth regressions. Moreover, we investigate the explanatory 
potential of fiscal policy and saving channels in the relationship between both variables. 
The role of investment on the inequality/growth nexus is also examined. Finally, as 
inequality is a relatively stable variable over time, we use the system GMM to capture 
cross-country variations in inequality. Additionally, this panel data technique allows us 
to deal with endogeneity and persistency issues of the relevant variables under study.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
on the relationship between inequality and growth in a reduced form as well as on the 
transmission channels. Section 3 presents the data and methodology employed in an 
empirical analysis. Section 4 reports and discusses the obtained results. Lastly, Section 5 
ends the paper with main conclusions and economic policy implications. 
2. Related Literature 
The empirical literature that estimates the reduce form of the relationship between 
inequality and growth aims to determine the effect (signal and magnitude) of inequality 
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on economic growth. The articles in this literature differ substantially from each other 
due to methodological issues, namely in the samples considered (groups of countries and 
time periods), the measure of inequality used, the sources, structure and quality of data 
and the estimation method considered in the empirical analysis. 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabelllini (1994) and Perotti (1996), 
using cross-country regressions, conclude that income inequality has a negative impact 
on long run growth. Li and Zou (1998), using fixed and random effects models, and 
Forbes (2000), using first-difference GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) for a sample with middle and high income economies, find a positive effect in a 
short and medium run. Using a 3SLS (three-stage least squares) estimator, Barro (2000) 
reports an inconclusive impact of inequality on growth, albeit negative for poor countries 
and positive for rich countries. Chen (2003) supports the hypothesis that both variables 
are not monotonous, but in inverted U. Banerjee and Duflo (2003) find the presence of 
nonlinearities in the inequality/growth relationship, with net changes in inequality 
negatively influencing growth. Through system GMM from Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998), Voitchovsky (2005) points out that the effect of inequality 
at the top of the income distribution on growth is positive, as opposed to the negative 
effect of inequality at the bottom, although insignificant when the author uses the Gini 
coefficient. Castelló-Climent (2010) partially support the results of Barro (2000): 
inequality has a negative effect for the sample as a whole and for low and middle-income 
economies and a negligible or even positive effect for high income economies. Halter et 
al. (2014) emphasize that the temporal dimension is a determining factor in analyzing the 
impact of inequality on growth, with a positive impact in the short run and negative in the 
long run. Using instrumental variables method with panel data, Brueckner and Lederman 
(2018) show that the relationship between inequality and growth depends on the initial 
income level: in poor countries, inequality promotes growth; in rich countries, inequality 
has a negative effect. Finally, Gründler and Scheuermeyer (2018) perform two-step 
system GMM and find a negative influence of inequality on growth in developing 
countries and in middle-income economies. In high-income countries, the authors found 
no correlation between inequality and growth. 
The fiscal policy channel has two perspectives: the traditional perspective, 
summarized by Perotti (1996) and developed by authors such as Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994), and the alternative perspective advanced by 
Béanabou (2000). The first perspective holds that, in more unequal societies, there is a 
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greater demand for redistributive policies, through the use of taxation and transfers 
(political link). This, in turn, results in negative effects on economic incentives, in terms 
of labor supply and saving and investment decisions, which jeopardizes the accumulation 
of physical capital and human capital and, consequently, economic growth (economic 
link). Bénabou (2000), in turn, considers a political economy framework combined with 
the presence of credit market imperfections and concludes for the possibility of the 
existence of multiple steady states. In more developed countries, in particular, inequality 
translates into greater influence of the richest on the political process and it is possible 
that greater inequality results in less redistribution. Consequently, in these countries, a 
higher level of inequality translates into a lower share of redistributive policies by taxes 
and transfers, that is, results into a lower level of fiscal progressivity and lower 
expenditures and social transfers. 
The classical perspective of the saving channel proposed by Kaldor (1956) 
postulates that a greater concentration of income increases the aggregate saving rate, 
given the greater propensity to save by the richest compared to the poorest. A higher 
savings rate encourages investment and, consequently, fosters growth. This perspective 
is counterbalanced within the scope of the credit market imperfections channel by the 
seminal contribution of Galor and Zeira (1993). Through a model of overlapping 
generations, the authors show that the existence of fixed costs and invisibilities in 
education prevent, in unequal societies and where there are indebtedness restrictions, the 
poorest from acquiring human capital, which hinders economic growth. Galor and Moav 
(2004) unify both perspectives and advance the existence of multiple steady states 
between inequality and growth during the development process. In early stages, physical 
capital accumulation is the main driver of growth; in this context, inequality contributes 
to growth by enabling greater accumulation of physical capital. In advanced stages, the 
main driver of growth is human capital accumulation. Thus, a more equal distribution of 
income allows for a greater investment in education. With borrowing restrictions eased 
and credit markets more developed, the impact of inequality on growth may become 
negligible. 
3. Empirical Framework 
3.1. Data 
This empirical analysis is based on a sample of high income thirty-four OECD 
countries, namely the Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), 
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Chile (CHL), the Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), 
France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Iceland (ISL), Ireland 
(IRL), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Latvia (LVA), Lithuania (LTU), 
Luxembourg (LUX), New Zealand (NZL), the Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), 
Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), the Republic of Korea (KOR), Slovakia (SVK), Slovenia 
(SVN), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), the United Kingdom (GBR) 
and the United States (USA). The analysis uses panel data during the period between 
1990 and 2019 and considers six non-overlapping intervals of economic growth: 1991-
1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010, 2011-2015 and 2016-2019. 
Our explanatory variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita, and it is 
calculated based on data of GDP per capita measured as expenditure-side real GDP at 
chained PPPs in 2017 USD millions and population, taken from the Penn World Table 
(PWT) version 10.0 (Feenstra et al., 2015). According Perotti (1996) and Forbes (2000), 
among other authors, we include the following explanatory variables: (i) the natural 
logarithm of initial GDP per capita (lnGDPpc); (ii) the human capital index, based on 
years of schooling and returns to education (HC); (iii) the price level of capital formation, 
price level of United States expenditure-side GDP at chained PPPs in 2017 USD millions 
in 2017=1 (PI), from Feenstra et al. (2015); and (iv) the Gini index of inequality, 
equivalized (square root scale) households disposable (post-tax, post-transfer) income 
(GINID), from Solt (2020) database (version 9.0 of SWIID)1. Moreover, we admit three 
control variables: (v) the share of elderly population, the population ages 65 and above as 
a percentage of total population (POP65); (vi) the urbanization rate, people living in urban 
areas as a percentage of total population (URB); and (vii) the natural logarithm of the 
average life expectancy at birth (lnLIFEEX). The data for these three variables are 
retrieved from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. The fiscal 
policy variables that represent transmission channels between inequality and economic 
growth are as follows: (viii) the share of public consumption on GDP, defined as the 
general government final consumption expenditure in percentage of GDP (GOVC), from 
the WDI; (ix) the share of taxes on income and social contributions on GDP, i.e., the sum 
of the share of taxes on income, profits and capital gains on GDP with the share of social 
security contributions on GDP (TINSC), being calculated using OECD data (Public 
Sector, Taxation and Market Regulation, Taxation, Global Revenue Statistics Database, 
                                                          
1 Solt (2020) database reports hundred different imputations for every observation, generated via Monte 
Carlo simulations. We consider the mean of these imputations for each observation. 
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from OECD.Stat); (x) the share of social spending on GDP (SSPEND), from OECD.Stat 
(Social Protection, Social Expenditure – Aggregated data); and (xi) redistribution, 
calculated as the difference between the Gini coefficient of market income and Gini 
coefficient of disposable income (REDIST), based in Solt (2020). Furthermore, we 
consider: (xii) the saving rate, constructed as the ratio between the saving net and the net 
national disposable income, assessed at current prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year, 
USD millions 2015 (SAV), taken from OECD.Stat data (Annual National Accounts, 
Disposable income and net lending - net borrowing); and (xiii) the investment rate, 
assumed as the gross capital formation in percentage of GDP (INV), from the WDI.  
The per capita income, the human capital index, the price level of investment, the 
Gini coefficient and the three control variables are measured at the beginning of each  five 
years growth period in order to mitigate the reverse causality, that is, the feedback from 
GDP dynamics to inequality. In addition, the share of public consumption on GDP, the 
share of taxes on income and social contributions on GDP, the share of social spending 
on GDP, redistribution, the saving rate and the investment rate are assessed as averages 
corresponding to the five years growth periods2.  
The inclusion of the initial per capita income allows to account the conditional 
convergence and the human capital index is a proxy for the stock of human capital. The 
price level of capital formation is the PPP value for of the investment deflator and it is a 
proxy for market distortions (e. g., tariffs, government regulation and corruption).  
In Appendix, we report the usual descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix 
between the variables under study.  
3.2. Methodology 
Regarding our methodological approach, we consider the following five-year non-
overlapping panel data specification3:  
𝑙𝑛(𝑦 )  −  𝑙𝑛(𝑦 ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛(𝑦 ) + 𝛾𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +  𝛿𝑋 +  𝜃 + 𝜇  + 𝜀              (1) 
where 𝑙𝑛(𝑦)  is the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita in country i  (i = 1, …, N) 
and period t (t = 1, …, T); 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  is the measure of income inequality in country 
i and period t; 𝑋  is a vector with control variables; 𝜃  denotes country-specific effect 
of country i; 𝜇  is a time effect of period t; and 𝜀  is the random disturbance error of 
                                                          
2 Note that the last period, 2016-2019, has just four years. 
3 Commonly in the literature, economic growth is defined as the difference between two levels of income 
in natural logarithms, (𝑙𝑛(𝑦)  −  𝑙𝑛(𝑦)  ).  
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country i and period t. The country dummies are included to control for time-invariant 
omitted-variable bias. The period dummies, in turn, are included to control for global 
shocks which may affect aggregate growth in any period, although are not captured by 
the explanatory variables.  
The equation (1) can be rewrite as:  
𝑙𝑛(𝑦 )  =  𝛼 + (1 + 𝛽) ln(𝑦 ) + 𝛾𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +  𝛿𝑋 +  𝜃 + 𝜇  + 𝜀                      (2) 
A parsimonious expression of the growth equation is sufficient to examine the 
impact of inequality on economic growth, as is usual in the literature (Cingano, 2014; 
Bartak and Jabłoński, 2019; Woo, 2020). 
The parameter 𝛽 is related to the convergence rate and the variable 𝑙𝑛(𝑦 ) is 
the control variable for convergence. The marginal effect of the measure of income 
inequality is captured by the coefficient 𝛾. In particular, the estimate of this coefficient 
gives us the contemporaneous effect of the measure of income inequality on the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita. The long-run effect is, in turn, given by: − 𝛾 / 𝛽.4   
The estimation method used is the two-step system GMM with forward 
orthogonal deviations and the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample corrected estimate of the 
variance in order to reduce finite simpe bias. System GMM exploits variation in 
inequality both between and within-country over time, considering variation in inequality 
across countries and accounting for other potentially relevant country-specific 
explanatory factors. This method allow us to lead with the persistence and endogeneity 
issues of the lagged income per capita and also of the income inequality measure. Income 
inequality can affect economic growth, but it simultaneously affected by this. In addition, 
the methodology chosen combines the equation in levels with the equation with forward 
orthogonal deviations and uses internal instruments (endogenous variables are 
instrumented with its own lags). Thus, the instruments of the endogenous variables of the 
levels equation are the lagged forward orthogonal deviations and the instruments of the 
equation with forward orthogonal deviations are the lagged levels variables. The two-step 
variant of system GMM weights the moment conditions by a consistent estimate of their 
covariance matrix. Although this procedure be asymptotically more efficient, in small 
samples the standard errors may be downward biased. The use of orthogonal deviations 
                                                          
4 In the long-run, level of GDP per capita corresponds to a level of steady state. Solving the first-order 
difference equation and differentiating with respect to inequality, we obtain: ∂ln(y) / ∂Inequality = − 𝛾 / 𝛽. 
As 𝛽 in modulus is less than 1, a permanent increase in inequality has a permanent effect on the steady state 
per capita income level.   
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is justified by the sample size of this study: thirty-four countries and six periods of 
economic growth, albeit without gaps in the data. Hayakawa (2009) through Monte-Carlo 
experiments concludes that, in many cases, the GMM estimator using forward orthogonal 
deviations perform better than that of the first-differencing method. The test statistics of 
the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (with the null hypothesis of the validity of 
instruments) and the number of instruments are reported. To avoid the problem of 
“instrument proliferation”, we follow instrument collapsing proposed by Roodman 
(2009), which consists of reducing of the number of instruments through horizontal 
squeezing of the instruments matrix (collapsed instrument matrix).5 The human capital 
index and the price level of investment are treated as predetermined variables. The share 
of elderly population, the urbanization rate and the average life expectancy at birth are 
considered exogenous variables. The remainder variables, including the lagged income 
per capita and the Gini coefficient, we assume they are endogenous.  
The estimates obtained by OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) are inconsistent, as some 
sources of bias are present, namely the omitted-variable bias and the endogeneity 
problem. A fixed-effects transformation allow us to eliminate the unobserved individual 
(time-invariant and country) effects 𝜃 , usually correlated with the explanatory variables 
of the model, which generates the “dynamic panel bias” (Nickell, 1981). Therefore, a 
growth regression estimated by a FE (Fixed Effects) model is also inconsistent. Blundell 
and Bond (1998) demonstrate in separate simulations that if the dependent variable is 
close to a random walk, difference GMM perform poorly since past levels convey little 
information about future changes. In this context, untransformed lags are weak 
instruments for transformed variables. Under an additional assumption and to increase 
efficiency, the authors, as suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995), advance an alternative 
strategy against dynamic panel bias. Instead of transforming the regressors to expunge 
the fixed effects, it transforms the instruments to make them exogenous to the fixed 
effects. Changes in any instrumenting variable are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. 
Thus, the expected value of the any instrumenting variable together with the individual 
fixed effect is time-invariant. In particular, the initial deviations of output from steady 
state are not correlated with the fixed effects. The forward orthogonal deviations 
transformation eliminate the fixed effects subtracting the average of all future available 
observations of a variable, instead of subtracting the previous observations from the 
                                                          
5 Many instruments can overfit endogenous variables and fail to expunge their endogenous component.  
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contemporaneous one (first differencing) or the mean from each observation (within 
transformation). This methodology avoids serial correlation of the transformed error 
terms and makes it possible to maintain the uncorrelatedness of these (for more details 
about this methodology, see Roodman, 2009). 
4. Analysis and discussion of the results 
4.1. Inequality/growth reduced form relationship 
Through the estimation of reduced form relationship between income inequality 
and economic growth for the high-income OECD economies, in Table 1, we can observe 
that the initial Gini coefficient of the disposable income has a positive and significant 
impact, at a 10% level of significance, on the subsequent economic growth in the period 
of  five years. This result is in line with the conclusions of Barro (2000) and Castelló-
Climent (2010) for rich countries, nevertheless, in opposite with the evidence found by 
Lee and Son (2016) for advanced economies, Brueckner and Lederman (2018) for high 
income countries and Bartak and Jabłoński (2019) for OECD countries. More 
specifically, a variation of the Gini coefficient of disposable income in one unit results in 
the contemporaneous variation in the same direction of the level of income per capita in 
0.01928 pp, ceteris paribus. The permanent effect (or the long-run effect) in the period of 
nearly five years is: 0.01928 / (1 - 0.499) = 0.03848 pp.  
The share of elderly population, the rate of urbanization and the average life 
expectancy are included as additional explanatory variables, in estimations (2), (3) and 
(4), respectively, following Perotti (1996). These variables influence and are influenced 
by the existing levels of inequality and produce effects on economic growth. The 
introduction of the share of elderly population results in an increase of the estimate of the 
Gini coefficient and its level of significance. In general, inequality is lower among retired 
people compared to the total population, but so is their average income. Additionally, the 
greater the share of the population aged 65 or more, the greater the share of social security 
expenditures, which can translate into less growth. Then, the omission of the age structure 
of the population can skew the coefficient of the measure of inequality downward. In turn, 
the inclusion of the urbanization rate leads to a decrease in the estimate of the Gini 
coefficient. Urban areas are characterized by greater income disparities but also by higher 
levels of income per capita. In the early stages of the development process, urbanization 
is associated with an increase in inequality; in the later stages, inequality falls (Kuznets, 
1955). Finally, the consideration of average life expectancy as a control variable also 
11 
 
contributes to the reduction of the estimate of the Gini coefficient and has a positive and 
significant effect on growth. A more equitable income distribution produces important 
gains in terms of average life expectancy and this, in turn, results in a greater investment 
on education and skills, in improving the health status of the population and, therefore, 
increases productivity and economic growth. 
The human capital index has a positive and significant impact on economic growth 
at a 5% level of significance in the estimations (1) and (3), however it becomes non-
significant in the estimations (2) and (4), after including the share of elderly population 
and the average life expectancy, respectively. In this regard, Perotti (1996) advanced that 
the share of the population aged 65 or more may be a proxy for the fertility rate. In 
advanced countries, low birth rates correspond to higher proportions of the elderly 
population and greater investment in human capital, especially by the female population. 
As mentioned above, a higher average life expectancy results in higher levels of 
education. Thus, the coefficient of this variable may be capturing the effect of human 
capital on growth dynamics. The price level of investment has, as expected, a negative 
effect on growth, although not significant. 
Table 1. Inequality/growth reduced form relationship estimates, 1990-2019 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐  0.499*** 0.530*** 0.497*** 0.554*** 
 (0.135) (0.116) (0.119) (0.131) 
𝐻𝐶  0.596** 0.352 0.596** 0.061 
 (0.260) (0.286) (0.240) (0.122) 
𝑃𝐼  -0.089 -0.045 -0.076 -0.061 
 (0.080) (0.132) (0.084) (0.104) 
𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐷  1.928* 1.943** 1.803* 1.828* 
 (0.991) (0.863) (0.967) (1.020) 
𝑃𝑂𝑃65   1.877   
  (1.405)   
𝑈𝑅𝐵    0.118  
   (0.416)  
𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑋     2.659** 
    (1.125) 
Observations 203 203 203 203 
Countries 34 34 34 34 
Hansen p-value 0.295 0.214 0.330 0.215 
Instruments 31 32 32 32 
Notes: (a) Two-step system GMM estimations with robust standard errors, small sample correction and 
forward orthogonal deviations; (b) The dependent variable is the ln of GDP per capita; (c) Robust standard 
errors in brackets; (d) Constant term estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony; (e) *, ** and *** 




4.2. The role of fiscal policy channel 
In this subsection, we analyse the role of fiscal policy channel in explaining the 
obtained positive impact of income inequality on economic growth. In specific, through 
two structural equations, we analyse: i) the effects of inequality on chosen fiscal policy 
channel variables, namely the share of public consumption on GDP, the share of taxes on 
income and social contributions on GDP,  the share of social spending on GDP and also 
on redistribution (first link), and ii) the effects of these fiscal policy variables on the 
economic growth rate (second link). The fiscal policy variables considered seek to capture 
a notion of fiscal progressivity and the effects of redistributive policies and associated tax 
financing. From a theoretical point of view, we can expect that these variables negatively 
affect the dynamics of economic growth, given the distortions created on the decisions of 
economic agents. 
In the first structural relationship, the fiscal policy variable is a function, in 
addition to the Gini coefficient of disposable income, of the initial level of per capita 
income and the percentage of elderly population. The inclusion of the initial level of per 
capita income is intended to capture the intuitive assumption that richer countries 
redistribute more income. The percentage of the population aged 65 and over determines 
whether a greater number of elderly people implies higher redistributive expenditure. In 
the second structural relationship, economic growth is explained considering the 
determinants identified above as well as the chosen fiscal policy variable, according to 
Perotti (1996), a proxy of the economic distortions caused by the tax financing of 
redistributive expenditure. 
Table 2 presents the estimates obtained when we consider the role of public  
consumption. The initial Gini coefficient has a negative and significant impact at a 5% 
level on the average share of public consumption on GDP (estimations 1 and 2). Although 
no country in the sample had an initial ln of the per capita income for each growth period 
of 12.0652, the effect can be positive from this threshold, as shown in estimation (2). The 
effect of the initial per capita income on the share of public consumption is negative, 
nevertheless, from the threshold of the Gini coefficient of 0.3623, it becomes positive, at 
a 10% level of significance. The share of elderly population is not significant but has a 
positive signal. Regressions (3) and (4) estimate the influence of the share of public 
consumption on growth. In both regressions, the impact of the share of public 
consumption is negative and highly significant, and the Gini coefficient is not significant. 
Due to distortions caused in the private sector, public consumption decreases the steady 
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state level of output. Then, the initial inequality promotes subsequent growth, via a 
negative impact on the share of public consumption on GDP. 
Table 2. Estimated regressions for the role of  public consumption, 1990-2019 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 GOVC GOVC lnGDPpc lnGDPpc 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐  -0.003 -0.050* 0.471*** 0.483*** 













𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐷  -0.292** -1.665** 
 
0.590 
 (0.111) (0.809) 
 
(0.907) 








𝑃𝑂𝑃65  0.175 0.206 
  








Observations 203 203 204 203 
Countries 34 34 34 34 
Hansen p-value 0.280 0.906 0.400 0.798 
Instruments 32 47 31 46 
Notes: (a) Two-step system GMM estimations with robust standard errors, small sample correction and 
forward orthogonal deviations; (b) The dependent variable is the ln of GDP per capita; (c) Robust standard 
errors in brackets; (d) Constant term estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony; (e) *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
By Table 3, income inequality has a negative and highly significant impact on the 
share of taxes on income and social contributions on GDP. The share of elderly population 
has a positive signal, and the initial income level has a negative signal, both highly 
significant (regression 1). Although, according to regression (2), the share of taxes on 
income and social contributions does not influence economic growth, regression (4) 
points to a negative impact, given the threshold value found, lnGDPpc = 18.515 / 2.184 
= 8.478, at a 10% level of significance. The joint consideration of the Gini coefficient 
with the share of taxes on income and social contributions on the growth regression results 
in the decrease in the estimate of the measure of inequality, given the initial estimate 
obtained in Table 1, 1.928 . This result is not surprising, since inequality affects the share 




Table 3. Estimated regressions for the role of taxes on income and social contributions, 1990-2019 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TINSC lnGDPpc lnGDPpc lnGDPpc 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐  -0.032*** 0.480*** 0.528*** 0.804*** 
 (0.012) (0.125) (0.105) (0.195) 
𝐻𝐶  
 
0.759*** 0.583*** 0.961*** 
 
 
(0.216) (0.190) (0.167) 
𝑃𝐼  
 
-0.055 -0.099 -0.128* 
 
 
(0.087) (0.111) (0.072) 








𝑃𝑂𝑃65  0.741*** 
   
 (0.169) 
   
𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐶  
 
-1.195 -0.453 18.515* 
 
 
(1.239) (1.175) (10.073) 
𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐶 × 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐  
   
-2.184** 
 
   
(1.040) 
Observations 203 204 203 204 
Countries 34 34 34 34 
Hansen p-value 0.346 0.214 0.836 0.856 
Instruments 32 31 46 46 
Notes: (a) Two-step system GMM estimations with robust standard errors, small sample correction and 
forward orthogonal deviations; (b) Robust standard errors in brackets; (c) Constant term estimated but 
omitted for reasons of parsimony; (d) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
Regarding the results on the role of social spending, presented in Table 4, the Gini 
coefficient of disposable income has a negative effect, however not significant, on the 
share of social expenditure on GDP (see estimation 1). The effect of the share of elderly 
population is positive and highly significant and the effect of the initial income level is 
negative and not significant. In turn, the share of social spending has a negative impact 
on growth at 10% level of significance (estimation 2). The estimate of the measure of 
inequality is reduced when the share of social expenditure is included in the growth 
regression (estimation 3), which may indicate that the Gini coefficient and the share of 








Table 4. Estimated regressions for the role of social spending, 1990-2019 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 SSPEND lnGDPpc lnGDPpc 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐  -0.009 0.499*** 0.512*** 





























Observations 199 200 199 
Countries 34 34 34 
Hansen p-value 0.314 0.339 0.849 
Instruments 32 31 46 
Notes: (a) Two-step system GMM estimations with robust standard errors, small sample correction and 
forward orthogonal deviations; (b) Robust standard errors in brackets; (c) Constant term estimated but 
omitted for reasons of parsimony; (d) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
Lastly, when we analyse the role of redistribution (see the results in Table 5), 
income inequality has a negative effect, however not significant, on redistribution. The 
effect of the share of elderly population is positive and significant at a 5% level and the 
effect of the initial income level is negative and not significant. Redistribution has no 
significant impact on the economic growth, as found by Cingano (2014), Thewissen 
(2014), and Berg et al. (2018) for the subsample of OECD countries, but its signal is 
negative. Hence, redistribution is neutral to growth. In this regard, Gründler and 
Scheuermeyer (2018) conclude that redistribution is harmful for growth in rich countries 
and Woo (2020) find the same result for the subsample of OECD countries. The estimate 
of the Gini coefficient maintains when redistribution is introduced in the growth 
regression, which may indicate that the Gini coefficient and redistribution are not related.  
On the one hand, the negative impact of the inequality on the share of public 
consumption and on the share of taxes on income and social contributions could verify 
the hypothesis of Bénabou (2000) that, in contrast to the political link stated in the 
traditional perspective of the fiscal policy channel, advances that, in more unequal 
countries, taxation and redistribution are less, not greater. Also De Mello and Tiongson 
(2006) for the sample of high-income countries and both Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-
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Sagalés (2013) and Islam et al. (2018) for OECD countries conclude by this result. On 
the other hand, the negative impact of the share of public consumption, share of taxes on 
income and social contributions and share of social spending on growth corroborates the 
economic link from the traditional perspective of the fiscal policy channel, which sustains 
that taxation and a greater use of redistributive policies creates economic disincentives to 
work, saving and investment and thus hinders growth. Earlier, Tanninen (1999) reports a 
negative impact of public consumption on economic growth, but non a statistically 
significant effect of inequality on the public consumption. Then, the initial inequality 
promotes subsequent growth, via a negative impact on the share of public consumption 
and on the share of taxes on income and social contributions on GDP. 
Table 5. Estimated regressions for the role of redistribution, 1990-2019 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 REDIST lnGDPpc lnGDPpc 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐  -0.029 0.409*** 0.527*** 





























Observations 199 200 199 
Countries 34 34 34 
Hansen p-value 0.314 0.339 0.849 
Instruments 32 31 46 
Notes: (a) Two-step system GMM estimations with robust standard errors, small sample correction and 
forward orthogonal deviations; (b) Robust standard errors in brackets; (c) Constant term estimated but 
omitted for reasons of parsimony; (d) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
4.3. The role of saving channel 
Among the transmission channels identified in the literature, the saving channel 
is the one that is least explored empirically. Barro (2000) studies this channel, albeit 
superficially. The author tests whether the investment rate, influenced by the aggregate 
savings rate, is determined by income inequality, and concludes that the Gini coefficient 
has no impact on the investment rate. 
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In this subsection, we analyse the effects of income disparities on growth through 
the saving channel, considering two fundamental mechanisms: i) the effect of inequality 
on the saving rate, and ii) the impact of the saving rate on economic growth. The use of 
national saving rather than investment makes it possible to exclude external saving flows 
from investment financing, which are not subject to domestic income inequality. The 
variable that captures the saving mechanism refers to the nation's average net saving rate 
and can be interpreted as a proxy for the share of investment financed entirely using 
domestic savings. 
In addition to the effect of the inequality measure on the saving rate, we also assess 
the effects of the share of public consumption and of the share of taxes on income and 
social contributions on it.6 The purpose is to determine whether, in fact, these fiscal policy 
variables have an impact on the saving rate, given that they produce distorting effects at 
the level of economic agents' saving decisions. 
The results are presented in Table 6. As we can see in detail, regression (1) points 
to a positive and statistically significant impact at a 5% level of income inequality on the 
average saving rate. The initial level of per capita income is positive, albeit non-
significant, and the human capital index has a negative signal at a 10% level of 
significance. The share of public consumption on GDP is included as an explanatory 
variable for the saving rate, without and with the simultaneous presence of the Gini 
coefficient (estimations 3 and 4, respectively). In both, the effect of share of public 
consumption is negative and highly significant on the saving rate. The share of taxes on 
income and social contributions on GDP has a negative and significant effect at 10% level 
on the saving rate. The joint consideration of the Gini coefficient with the share of taxes 
on income and social contributions on GDP results in the loss of significance of the 
measure of inequality and in the  absence of significance of the share of taxes on income 
and social contributions (estimations 4 and 5). These results verify the economic link 
from the traditional perspective of the fiscal policy channel: greater share of public 
consumption on GDP and share of taxes on income and social contributions creates 
disincentives to save. In turn, regressions (6) and (7) estimate a positive and highly 
significant effect of the average saving rate on the economic growth of the period.  
Furthermore, our findings corroborate the perspective of Kaldor (1956), who suggested 
                                                          
6 We also estimate the effects of the share of social expenditure and redistribution on the saving rate and 
we conclude that they are identical to those obtained using the share of public consumption and the share 
of taxes on income and social contributions. These results are available upon request.  
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that, since the propensity to save of the richest is higher than of the poorest, the increase 
in inequality increases the aggregate saving rate, promotes investment, through the 
accumulation of physical capital, and thus stimulates economic growth.  
In conclusion, inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient of disposable income, 
results in a higher aggregate saving rate and, consequently, contributes to the economic 
growth. Moreover, inequality promotes the saving rate, via  effects of the share of public 
consumption and share of taxes on income and social contributions on the saving rate.  
Table 6. Estimated regressions for the saving  channel, 1990-2019 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 SAV SAV SAV SAV 
SAV 
SAV lnGDPpc lnGDPpc 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐  0.092 -0.000 -0.005 0.100* 0.063 0.425*** 0.445*** 
 (0.059) (0.041) (0.037) (0.055) (0.048) (0.088) (0.068) 
𝐻𝐶  -0.163* 0.059 0.030 -0.092 -0.105 0.720*** 0.695*** 
 (0.080) (0.090) (0.067) (0.067) (0.074) (0.211) (0.176) 
𝑃𝐼  
   
  0.062 0.035 
 
   
  (0.071) (0.073) 
𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐷  1.578** 
 
0.530  1.301*  0.102 
 (0.619) 
 
(0.521)  (0.671)  (1.042) 
 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐶  
 




(0.590) (0.485)    
 
𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐶  
   
-0.857* -0.306  
 
 
   
(0.490) (0.428)  
 
𝑆𝐴𝑉  
   
  1.283*** 1.268*** 
 
   
  (0.317) (0.315) 
Observations 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 
Countries 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Hansen p-value 0.418 0.519 0.949 0.263 0.906 0.263 0.865 
Instruments 31 31 46 31 46 31 46 
Notes: (a) Two-step system GMM estimations with robust standard errors, small sample correction and 
forward orthogonal deviations; (b) Robust standard errors in brackets; (c) Constant term estimated but 
omitted for reasons of parsimony; (d) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
4.4. The role of investment 
In open economies, internally generated saving do not cover the entirety of 
investment expenditures made in the economy and recourse to international financial 
markets makes it possible to cover the difference. Consequently, saving and investment 
are dissociated, which justifies that we study separately the effects of inequality on both 
and their effects on economic growth. 
In this subsection, we have analysed how inequalities can influence economic 
performance through investment. In this analysis, similarly to what was done in the scope 
of the saving channel, we also consider two structural equations, namely: i) the impact of 
19 
 
the inequality measure on the investment rate, and ii) the impact of the investment rate 
on economic growth. Furthermore, we examine the effects of the share of public 
consumption and of the share of taxes on income and social contributions on the 
investment rate, in order to capture the distorting effects of these fiscal policy variables 
on investment decisions.7 The overall results of the role of investment are presented in 
Table 7. 
Table 1. Estimated regressions for the role of investment, 1990-2019 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 INV INV INV INV INV lnGDPpc lnGDPpc 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐  -0.074** -0.049 -0.062** -0.079** -0.070** 0.503*** 0.577*** 
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.024) (0.039) (0.027) (0.158) (0.106) 
𝐻𝐶  0.058 0.041 0.040 0.104 0.068 0.729*** 0.527*** 
 (0.041) (0.058) (0.049) (0.063) (0.042) (0.244) (0.183) 
𝑃𝐼  -0.020 0.012 0.008 -0.027 -0.032 -0.047 -0.061 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.019) (0.024) (0.022) (0.085) (0.078) 
𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐷  0.603** 
 
0.400  0.382  1.402 
 (0.265) 
 
(0.246)  (0.301)  (0.838) 
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐶  
 




(0.320) (0.263)    
 
𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐶  
   
-0.626* -0.531**  
 
 
   
(0.358) (0.254)  
 
𝐼𝑁𝑉  
   
  1.108* 0.790 
 
   
  (0.654) (0.531) 
Observations 203 204 203 204 203 204 203 
Countries 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Hansen p-value 0.335 0.298 0.917 0.383 0.835 0.253 0.810 
Instruments 31 31 46 31 46 31 46 
Notes: (a) Two-step system GMM estimations with robust standard errors, small sample correction and 
forward orthogonal deviations; (b) Robust standard errors in brackets; (c) Constant term estimated but 
omitted for reasons of parsimony; (d) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
Estimation (1) shows that the initial Gini coefficient has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the average investment rate at a 5% level of significance. Conversely, 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) found that the share of the third quintile has a positive effect 
on the investment rate, especially in democracies, and, thereby, more equality translates 
into the higher investment rate. In addition, Barro (2000) concluded by a weak effect of 
income inequality on the investment rate. The share of public consumption on GDP, in 
turn, negatively affects the investment rate at a 5% level, which points to the occurrence 
                                                          
7 We also estimate the effects of the share of social expenditure and redistribution on the investment rate 
and we conclude that they are identical to those obtained using the share of public consumption and the 
share of taxes on income and social contributions. These results are available upon request. 
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of a crowding-out effect of public consumption on private investment. When 
simultaneously we consider the Gini coefficient and the share of public consumption on 
GDP as explanatory variables, the effect of the first on the investment rate is not 
significant and the estimate of the second is reduced in modulus and loses significance. 
The share of taxes on income and social contributions on GDP has a negative and 
significant effect on the investment rate at a 10% level; when we consider the Gini 
coefficient, the estimate in modulus decreases, but becomes significant at a 5% level. The 
signal of the level of initial per capita income is negative and significant at a 5% in the 
estimations (1)-(5), except in the estimation (2). In fact, in the richest countries, GDP per 
capita and investment rate are negatively correlated. Regressions (6) and (7) assess the 
impact of the investment rate on economic growth, without and with the inclusion of the 
measure of inequality in parallel, respectively. Without the presence of the Gini 
coefficient, the investment rate has a positive influence on growth at 10% level of 
significance. In turn, Persson and Tabellini (1994) do not found statistical signficance, 
although the signal be positive. With the presence of the Gini coefficient, the impact 
becomes non significant. These results, although weaker, are consistent with the evidence 
found within the scope of the saving channel.  
In short, empirical evidence suggests that income inequality enhances economic 
growth through the positive impact on the investment rate as well as through an impacts 
of the share of public consumption and the share of taxes on income and social 
contributions on the investment rate. 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
By resorting the two-step system GMM, we analyze the impact of inequality on 
economic growth as well as the interpretive potential of fiscal policy and saving channels 
and also the role of investment for a sample of thirty-four advanced OECD countries 
between 1990 and 2019. Our article overcomes a gap in the literature by studying these 
transmission channels considering a sample of developed countries. The robustness of the 
system GMM allows, on the one hand, to incorporate the fact that inequality is relatively 
constant over time and that a large part of its variation is cross-sectional. On the other 
hand, it allows us to deal with the endogenous and persistent nature of some explanatory 
variables, namely the initial level of per capita income and the measure of inequality, and 
with unobservable individual effects. When comparable with other estimation methods, 
the outcomes of such panel data technique are less biased and more efficient.  
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We find evidence pointing to a positive impact of disposable income inequality 
on subsequent economic growth of the five-year period, albeit only at a 10% level of 
significance. This result is explained in the scope of fiscal policy and saving channels. 
The perspective of Bénabou (2000) who argues that a higher level of inequality 
corresponds to a lower share of redistributive policies is corroborated: higher inequality 
results in a lower shares of public consumption and direct taxation on output. The 
economic link associated with the traditional perspective of the fiscal policy channel is 
also verified. Greater shares of public consumption, direct taxation and social expenditure 
have negative effects on growth. However, for redistribution, we find no evidence. The 
classical saving channel approach, advanced by Kaldor (1956), has empirical support: a 
higher level of inequality results in a higher savings rate and this, in turn, fosters growth. 
Additionally, we confirm the role of investment in the inequality/growth relationship. In 
particular, inequality stimulates the investment rate, which is beneficial to the 
performance of the economy. Finally, we report that the fiscal policy variables mentioned 
above have distorting effects on saving and investment, as predicted by theory. 
These empirical results obtained seem to confirm the efficiency/equity trade-off 
as suggested by Okun (1975). A greater income disparity among advanced OECD 
countries translates into faster growth. Thus, countries with a more equal distribution of 
income grow more slowly. Barro (2000) states that in developed countries, aspects of 
inequality that promote growth, such as economic incentives and savings, are more 
relevant. Marrero and Rodríguez (2013) argue that differences in opportunities are less 
important in developed countries. Thus, the effect of inequality on growth can be more 
attenuated in this way.  
Nevertheless, from a point of view of economic policy recommendations, we do 
not suggest, in the context of advanced OECD countries, the increase in income 
inequality, which has occurred in recent decades, and/or that the government reduces 
public consumption, especially productive and distributive spending on education and 
health, and cut direct taxation and social spending and transfers to promote greater 
economic growth. On the one hand, increasing inequality and cutting social expenditure 
can jeopardize social cohesion, increase poverty levels, result in the emergence of 
sociopolitical movements that threaten social stability and contribute to the 
delegitimization of the democratic system and block its functioning. In this scenario, 
economic growth itself would suffer. On the other hand, there may be inequality effects 
on growth that are not captured in our analysis. For example, investment in education, 
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especially in higher education, and social protection can be carried out in developed 
countries through household debt. Whether private debt assumes high values could 
compromise macroeconomic stability, provoke financial crises and negatively affect 
economic growth. 
As suggestions for future research on the transmission channels between 
inequality and growth in developed countries, we propose to study the effects of 
inequality on investment in human capital, especially in higher education, and on the use 
of private credit and consequently their role on economic growth. 
Our paper uses a more recent inequality data set from Solt (2020), in particular, 
the disposable Gini coefficient. This is the measure of inequality most commonly used in 
the empirical literature; however, it is a measure of average inequality. Some effects of 
inequality on growth may not be captured using it. Thus, the use of other measures of 
inequality, namely measures that reflect different parts of the income distribution, is 
recommended in future research on the transmission channels between inequality and 
growth.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A2. Descriptive Statistics, 1990-2019 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum Obs. 
lnGDPpc 10.3931 0.4607 11.6346 9.0139 238 
GINID 0.2984 0.052 0.5077 0.1754 204 
HC 3.2023 0.3555 3.8915 1.94 238 
PI 0.6814 0.1944 1.2531 0.1972 238 
POP65 0.1519 0.0355 0.28 0.0523 238 
URB 0.7592 0.1144 0.9804 0.4792 238 
lnLIFEEX 4.35 0.0455 4.4284 4.1956 204 
GOVC 0.1945 0.036 0.2646 0.0983 204 
TINSC 0.2082 0.0521 0.3185 0.0562 204 
SSPEND 0.1977 0.0544 0.315 0,0277 200 
REDIST 0.1669 0.048 0.2546 0.0111 203 
SAV 0.0829 0.0858 0.2882 -0.4152 193 
INV 0.2337 0.0389 0.3902 0.1233 204 
 
Table A2. Correlation matrix, 1990-2019 
 lnGDPpc GINID HC PI POP65 URB lnLIFEEX GOVC TINSC SSPEND REDIST SAV INV 
lnGDPpc 1             
GINID -0.2153 1            
HC 0.5015 -0.14 1           
PI 0.6414 -0.142 0.4312 1          
POP65 0.3813 -0.209 0.2059 0.3169 1         
URB 0.3774 0.1211 0.2348 0.4474 -0.0016 1        
lnLIFEEX 0.8044 0.0591 0.348 0.6502 0.3853 0.4402 1       
GOVC -0.0306 -0.508 -0.004 0.1268 0.2556 0.1884 -0.0433 1      
TINSC 0.3253 -0.716 0.0993 0.2647 0.4609 0.0625 0.1518 0.6102 1     
SSPEND 0.2957 -0.474 -0.038 0.2384 0.588 0.0442 0.3033 0.5775 0.8147 1    
REDIST 0.2678 -0.579 0.0362 0.1541 0.4742 -0.071 0.0699 0.6196 0.7118 0.7565 1   
SAV 0.4418 -0.001 0.1796 0.2836 -0.1951 0.2756 0.4012 -0.346 -0.009 -0.217 -0.191 1  




The relationship in a reduced form between inequality and growth as well as the 
transmission channels that operate between both variables were, from an empirical point 
of view, pioneering tested using a sectional data structure (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; 
Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Perotti, 1996). Hereafter, the use of panel data 
methodologies was considered by researchers who studied this topic and supplanted the 
use of cross-section data.  
While cross-country estimations are based on differences between countries, 
studying the inequality/growth relationship over a long period of time, panel estimations 
allow us to investigate this relationship within countries over time, generally in short 
periods of economic growth (five or ten years). 
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Sectional economic growth regressions suffer from inconsistency in not 
controlling for specific, unobservable characteristics of countries. In particular, this 
omission results in biased estimates of the explanatory variables. By construction, cross-
section estimations do not allow correcting the bias caused by the omission of time-
invariant variables, through the estimation of country-specific effects. Panel estimates, on 
the other hand, allow controlling specific characteristics, by removing the bias resulting 
from the correlation of country-specific effects with the explanatory variables. The 
second source of inconsistency is related to the endogenous nature of some explanatory 
variables that usually appear as regressors in cross-section analyzes of economic growth. 
In this regard, sectional regressions do not seem adequate in the treatment of these 
variables. Standard panel data methodologies (fixed effects and random effects) do not 
allow to overcome this problem either. Therefore, as in cross-country estimations, the 
problem of endogeneity of explanatory variables in panel regressions remains. 
Moreover, standard panel estimation methods are inadequate for estimating the 
relationship between inequality and growth, as Li and Zou (1998) done. On the one hand, 
the explanatory variables used in typical economic growth regressions are generally 
correlated with country-specific effects, which makes the random effects estimator 
inconsistent, even this estimator being more efficient, since it incorporates information 
both from the sectional units individually and from the time periods. On the other hand, 
the use of a fixed effects estimator can lead to biased results in the presence of variables 
that are constant over time or whose variation is especially cross-sectional, as is the case 
of income inequality. In addition, a fixed effects model eliminates sectional information 
from the data. 
Forbes (2000) used the first-difference GMM estimator in this analysis, however, 
the estimates obtained lack consistency. When variables are persistent, as in the case of 
measure of inequality, the lagged variables of the explanatory variables are weak 
instruments for the variables in first differences. Even the lagged explanatory variable 
does not perform well in the regressions. Moreover, making a first differences eliminates 
most of the variation in the data.  
The system GMM developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) was then used by researchers to overcome this issue of instrument quality. 
This method has clear advantages, since reflects cross-country variations in inequality 
and allows for dealing with common sources of bias, namely: the omitted-variable bias, 
resulting from correlation between country specific fixed effects and the regressors; the 
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endogeneity problem, due to potential correlation between the regressors and the error 
term; measurement errors in the independent variables; and dynamic panel bias.  
 
